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Key developments at national level in legislation, case law and policy
The Netherlands 
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Ministerial Decree regarding the general duty to realize accessibility for persons with 
disabilities as provided in the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA)
As of 1 January 2017, the Disability Discrimination Act imposes a more general duty on all those bound 
by it to improve accessibility for people with disabilities in addition to the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation in individual cases (Article 2a (1)).59 As the Act covers not only employment but also 
access to goods and services including housing and education, the scope of this provision is wide. The 
duty is of a proactive, general nature and imposes the realisation – at least gradually – of accessibility 
for persons with disabilities, unless it creates a disproportionate burden. The further implementation of 
this provision is now ensured by a Ministerial Decree.60
The Decree stipulates that the duty of gradual realisation of accessibility entails at least the duty to 
immediately provide for facilities that are ‘easy to achieve’ in terms of effort and cost, and to then 
gradually provide for general accessibility. As regards the latter it will be crucial how much leeway 
the ‘disproportionate burden’ criterion will leave for justifying exceptions to the general duty to realise 
accessibility.
In addition, the Decree requires the Minister of Security and Justice to promote the development of 
action plans to realise general accessibility in all the sectors covered by the Act in cooperation with 
representative organisations of persons with disabilities, to monitor the implementation of the Decree 
and to report annually to Parliament.
Internet source: 
Decree General accessibility for persons with a disability or chronic illness (Besluit algemene toegankelijkheid 
voor personen met een handicap of chronische ziekte) of 7 June 2017, Staatsblad 2017, 256 of 20 June 
2017:
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039653/2017-06-21 
CASE LAW
Administrative High Court rules that self-employed women who did not receive a 
maternity benefit between 2004 and 2008 are entitled to compensation
On 27 July 2017, the Administrative High Court, the highest court in cases on social security, ruled that 
the State had breached the UN Convention on Women’s Rights by abolishing the right to a maternity 
benefit for self-employed women in 2004 and re-introducing the same right in 2008 without creating 
an arrangement for the women who had given birth between 2004 and 2008. The Court ruled that 
the social security authorities have to compensate the self-employed women who did not receive a 
maternity benefit between 2004 and 2008. As such the Court upheld the decision by the Administrative 
Court of the Mid-Netherlands of 9 October 2016, and overturned two decisions by the Administrative 
Courts Amsterdam of 18 July 2016.
59 This amendment of the DDA was already adopted in 2016 as part of the acts on ratification and implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but its entry into force was postponed to 1 January 2017. See 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2016-215.html.
60 Netherlands, Decree General accessibility for persons with a disability or chronic illness of 7 June 2017, Staatsblad 2017, 
256 of 20 June 2017.
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The claimants, three self-employed women, had been involved in litigation about their right to a 
maternity benefit since 2005, with the support of trade union ‘FNV self-employed’, the Association for 
women and law and the Clara Wichmann fund for test cases. A procedure in the Netherlands, up to the 
Dutch Supreme Court, yielded nothing. In the procedure before the CEDAW Committee, the Committee 
ruled in plain language that the women were entitled to a maternity benefit and that the State had 
breached the Convention on Women’s Rights by not creating an arrangement for them. Even this ruling 
did not induce the State to set things right. The women then started yet another procedure, in which 
they asked the social security authorities to grant them the benefit. On 18 July 2016, the Amsterdam 
Administrative Court dismissed the claim of two of the claimants. The Administrative Court of the Mid-
Netherlands allowed the claim of one of the other women. The latter decision has now been ratified by 
the Administrative High Court.
The Administrative High Court ruled in the first place that the opinion by CEDAW must be seen as 
‘authoritative’ and as an opinion which is especially significant in the present procedure. The Court 
therefore follows CEDAW’s point of view that Article 11(2)(b) of the UN Treaty concerns self-employed 
women as well. Subsequently the Court ruled that this article can be invoked directly. This may not have 
been the case at the time that the Dutch Supreme Court rendered its earlier judgment (in 2011), but the 
Supreme Court changed its case law on this subject in a judgment of 2014.
It follows from Article 11(2)(b) that pregnant self-employed women were entitled to some form of 
compensation in the period between 2004 and 2008 during which time no maternity benefit existed 
for this group. By not granting them this compensation the State breached its obligations under the UN 
Women’s Treaty.
The foregoing does not mean that the women involved are, without a doubt, as yet entitled to a maternity 
benefit. It means that the social security authorities must take a decision on how to comply with Article 
11(2)(b). If no (accurate) decision is taken within 16 weeks, the women will, however, be entitled to a 
maternity benefit on the basis of the law that applied until 1 August 2004 or the law that entered into 
force on 4 June 2008. 
The judgment is relevant because 1) the authority of CEDAW is explicitly recognized, 2) it is confirmed 
that Article 11(2)(b) also relates to self-employed women, 3) the Court ruled that Article 11(2)(b) can be 
invoked directly, and 4) most important of all, self-employed women who gave birth between 1 August 
2004 and 4 June 2008 and did not receive a maternity benefit are now entitled to compensation. This 
does not only apply to the three women involved in the proceedings, but also to approximately 17 000 
other women. The social security authorities promised at an earlier stage that all women who are in 
the same situation as the claimants, will be treated in the same manner. It is expected that the social 
security authorities will consult the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment on how to comply with the 
judgment. 
Internet source: 
http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:CRVB:2017:2461 (court decision)
Reasonable accommodation in access to goods and services for people with disabilities
The claimant is blind and wished to shop at a chemist’s, therefore asking personnel to take her by the 
arm and guide her through the shop. Finding that this would be too cumbersome, the shop attendant 
instead offered to collect the items on her shopping list and bring them to her. As this arrangement would 
not enable the claimant to browse and select the items herself, she suggested that she could come to 
the shop at a calmer time to then be guided through the store as she wished, but this was also refused. 
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The claimant brought the case before the National Institute of Human Rights (NIHR), which concluded that 
the shop had violated its duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the Disability Discrimination 
Act.61 It held that the accommodation offered by the shop was not sufficient, in particular because it 
had not really investigated whether providing the accommodation as suggested by the claimant herself 
would indeed impose a disproportionate burden. In this respect the NIHR emphasised that the purpose 
of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is to realise the autonomy of disabled persons 
to the greatest extent possible.62
Internet source:
https://www.mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/oordelen/2017-104/detail 
Limitations on the wearing of religious dress in public functions
The claimant is a Muslim woman working with the police, who wears a headscarf for religious reasons. 
The dress code of the police is based on so-called ‘life style neutrality’, with the aim of achieving a neutral 
and uniform appearance to enhance the authority and safety of police officers. As a consequence, all 
sorts of expressions of personal identity, including not just headscarves and other symbols of personal 
conviction but also conspicuous tattoos, haircuts and piercings are prohibited. 
The claimant is employed as an ‘intake and service assistant’ with two main tasks: to answer the service 
number of the police and to take the reports of citizens through a video connection (in the latter situation, 
she has visible contact with citizens). Police personnel in visual contact with citizens through a video 
connection are usually in uniform, but due to the fact that the claimant is not allowed to wear her 
headscarf with the uniform, she has instead been allowed to accomplish this task while wearing her 
headscarf and civilian clothes. The claimant is not satisfied with this accommodation as it sets her 
apart and she considers that the prohibition to wear a headscarf with a uniform will limit her career 
opportunities within the police. 
The NIHR found that not allowing the woman to wear her headscarf with a uniform constitutes indirect 
discrimination on grounds of religion.63 Although the NIHR accepted the legitimacy of the goals pursued 
by the dress policy, it considered that in the specific circumstances of the case it was not necessary to 
apply this policy which was therefore not objectively justified. Indeed, the argument related to the safety 
of the police is not applicable as the work is done through a video connection, while the argument related 
to neutrality is found by the NIHR to be of limited importance considering the administrative nature 
of the work. The NIHR therefore recognises the importance of maintaining state neutrality in public 
functions but limits its consequences to situations where it can be regarded as strictly necessary. 
Internet source:
https://www.mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/oordelen/2017-135/detail
Judgment by the Administrative High Court on less favourable treatment of an employee 
because of parental leave
On 23 November 2017 the Administrative High Court, the highest court in cases on social security, 
ruled that the police, in its capacity as employer, had breached the law by terminating the temporary 
assignment of a police officer because he had taken parental leave. 
61 Netherlands, NIHR, Opinion No. 2017-104 of 7 September 2017. 
62 The NIHR is a quasi-judicial body which issues non-binding Opinions. In the majority of cases, its opinions are followed by 
the conventional courts.
63 NIHR 20 November 2017, Opinion No. 2017-167. https://www.mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/oordelen/2017-135/detail.
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The police officer in this case had been temporarily placed in a higher position for the duration of one 
year. One month before the start of his new position, he was granted parental leave for two days a week. 
Three months after the start of the new job, the police terminated the employee’s assignment because 
they argued that his parental leave caused problems for the work process. The police officer contested 
this point of view in court, but his claim was dismissed by the court of first instance. The court ruled that 
the termination did not constitute ‘less favourable treatment’ within the meaning of the law, because the 
formal terms of employment did not change; only the temporary position ended.
On appeal, the Administrative High Court ruled that the termination of the temporary assignment 
did constitute less favourable treatment. The Court came to this decision because in the first place 
the termination harmed the career of the police officer by limiting the period during which he could 
gain experience in a higher position. Secondly, he suffered financial damage because his temporary 
allowance also stopped, and thirdly his file now stated that his attitude had not been constructive. The 
Administrative High Court referred to the fact that, following the implementation of Directive 2010/18/
EU, a prohibition on less favourable treatment because of the use of parental leave had been introduced 
into the Employment and Care Act. This prohibition does not only refer to less favourable treatment in 
a formal sense, but also to disadvantages in a more material sense. The court furthermore pointed out 
that granting parental leave may be refused for business/organizational reasons, but that the court 
cannot justify less favourable treatment if the leave has already been granted. In this case the police 
organisation had granted the leave before the start of the temporary position, and therefore should have 
found a solution other than terminating the employee’s contract in order to tackle problems in the work 
process.
The judgment is relevant because it clarifies that ‘less favourable treatment’ within the meaning of the 
law does not only include negative changes in the formal contractual position of the employee, but also 
changes that might have a negative effect on the career of an employee and changes of a temporary 
nature. The notion of ‘less favourable treatment’ must therefore be interpreted in a broad way. Also 
relevant is the fact that the Administrative High Court made it clear that business reasons may justify 
the refusal of parental leave, but cannot justify a less favourable treatment because of leave that has 
previously been granted. Both points are relevant for the rights of employees who take parental leave.
Internet source: 
http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:CRVB:2017:4067 (court decision)
Norway 
CASE LAW
Tribunal of the Equality Body on the request for change of name in publications after 
gender change 
The Tribunal of the Equality Body published a decision on 24 November 2017 regarding a request to the 
National Library to change a name in previous publications after the author had undergone a sex and 
subsequent name change. The National Library argued that this was an impossible request considering 
the design of the data catalogue system. They argued that changing the name would ruin the search 
function of the system.
The complainant argued that she had been placed in a less advantageous position than people who had 
not undergone a sex change, because it affected her career development since she could not rely on her 
previous work published under her old name. 
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